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ABSTRACT 
Adopting a profit-based approach to the estimation of the technical efficiency of South 
Korean banks over the 2007Q3 to 2011Q2 period, we systematically analyse, within a non-
parametric DEA analysis, how the choice of risk management control variable impacts upon 
such estimates.  Using the model of Liu et al. (2010), we examine the dependency of the 
estimated technical efficiency scores on the chosen risk control variables embracing loan loss 
provisions and equity as good inputs and non-performing loans as a bad output.  We duly find 
that, both for individual banks and banking groups, the mean estimates are indeed model 
dependent although, for the former, rank correlations do not change much at the extremes.  
Based on the application of the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, we then 
find that, if only one of the three risk control variables is to be included in such an analysis, 
then it should be loan loss provisions.  We also show, however, that the inclusion of all three 
risk control variable is to be preferred to just including one, but that the inclusion of two such 
variables is about as good as including all three.  We therefore conclude that the optimal 
approach is to include (any) two of the three risk control variables identified.  The wider 
implication for research into bank efficiency is that the optimal choice of risk management 
control variable is likely to be crucial to both the delivery of un-biased estimates of bank 
efficiency and the specification of the model to be estimated. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The dependency on bank efficiency estimates within a data envelopment analysis (DEA) on 
the specification of the input/output relationship is well known (see for example, Drake et al. 
(2009) for analysis of the issue within a Japanese context).  Moreover, there is wide 
awareness within the research community – see below at section 2 – of the need to 
incorporate risk management control variables within such models if unbiased efficiency 
estimates are to be produced.  However, little empirical research has been undertaken to 
examine the sensitivity of such estimates to the choice of risk control variable
1
.  Accordingly, 
this study, as far as we are aware, represents the first to systematically address this issue, 
within a Korean context, using a recently released rich data set covering the development of 
the South Korean banking industry during the period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2.  This period, of 
course traverses the pre, actual and post – Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eras, thus allowing 
for interesting inter-temporal comparisons. 
 In terms of the input/output specification, we have opted for the ‘profit-based’ 
approach, pioneered by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997 and 
2003), in preference to the so-called ‘production’ and ‘intermediation’ approaches developed 
by Benston and Smith (1976) and Sealey and Lindley (1977) respectively.  Arguably, this is 
the most relevant approach for banking systems that are open, highly-developed and 
competitive, as in South Korea (see Hall and Simper (2013); Doh (2012); and Ree et al. 
(2012)).  Moreover, as argued by Berger and Mester (1997), the profit-based approach is 
superior to both the intermediation and production approaches because it takes account of 
inefficiencies on both the input and output fronts.   
 The need to include risk control variables within an analysis of Korean bank 
efficiency was highlighted by Korea’s experience with the GFC.  Given the Korean banks’ 
dependence on overseas markets for the funding of domestic loans
2
 and the deterioration in 
asset quality
3
, management control of interest rate, exchange rate and liquidity risks was at a 
premium alongside credit risk management.   
                                                 
1
  One such study was undertaken by Hadad et al. (2012) who examined the sensitivity of bank efficiency scores 
to the choice of risk control variable (i.e., loan loss provisions or equity) within an Indonesian context. 
2
  During the GFC, long-term overseas borrowing by Korean banks declined dramatically as international 
funding markets dried up, falling from US$11.3 billion in 2007 to US$6.23 billion in 2008 and then to US$4.25 
billion in 2009. 
3
  Korean banks’ ‘substandard’ loans rose from 0.72% of total loans in December 2007 to 1.9% by December 
2010.  This subsequently led to the establishment of a government bank recapitalisation fund with an 
endowment of 20 trillion Korean Won (KRW) (US$13.5 billion) and the provision of a government guarantee to 
over US$100 billion of banks’ overseas borrowings. 
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 As for the selection of risk management control variables to be included in the 
analysis, the standard variables available from the banks’ published reports and accounts 
embrace: ‘Loan Loss Provisions’ (LLP)4, which directly affect profits through the banks’ 
income statement; ‘Equity’, which is accumulated on the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
and directly affects the cost of banks’ risk-taking; and, finally, ‘Non-performing Loans’ 
(NPL), for which accounting definitions differ across financial systems worldwide
5
.  Like 
most other authors – see section 2 – we focus on these three variables in our analysis, but use 
a relatively-new non-parametric model proposed by Liu et al. (2010) that allows for the 
inclusion of both ‘desirable’ inputs (i.e., LLP and Equity) and ‘undesirable’ outputs (i.e., 
NPL) within a profit-based approach to efficiency estimation.  Finally, using the Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, we are able to determine which variables to 
exclude/include in our systematic modelling strategy and whether the different models, 
reflecting the different input/output specifications, produce significant differences in X-
efficiency distributions. 
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2 we briefly discuss the background to 
the inclusion of risk management control variables in bank efficiency studies.  Section 3 
describes our non-parametric modelling methodology which allows all and sub-sets of the 
risk management control variables to be included in efficiency estimation and also how we 
distinguish between the different estimated modelling distributions.  Section 4 presents the 
results of our analysis of South Korean banking profit efficiency, looking at how scores 
change (if at all) under the different postulated specifications.  Finally, in section 5 we 
summarise and conclude. 
 
2 Risk management control variables used in the bank efficiency empirical literature 
 
Taking each of the three risk management variables commonly used in the literature in turn, 
the use of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) as a risk control variable can lead to problematic 
                                                 
4
  “The amount of losses which have been specifically identified is recognized as an expense and deducted from 
the carrying amount of the appropriate category of loans and advances as a provision for losses on loans and 
advances. The amount of potential losses not specifically identified but which experience indicates are present 
in the portfolio of loans and advances is also recognized as an expense and deducted from the total carrying 
amount of loans and advances as a provision for losses on loans and advances” (International Accounting 
Standard IAS 30). 
5
  An NPL under Basel II (Basel Committee, 2004) is any loan that is past due for more than 90 days, but it is 
subject to wide national variation.  If we consider how many days a bank has to allow for a 100% consumer loan 
write-down as a non-performing loan in South America, it is 366 days in Argentina, 180 in Chile, 90 in 
Columbia, 120 in Ecuador, 126 in Mexico and 120 in Peru (for more details see Galindo and Rojas-Suarez 
(2011)). 
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modelling if one is considering diverse banks with large differentiated outputs and also if 
making a cross-country comparison of banks.  In the latter case, differing corporate 
governance, tax and supervisory issues in each financial jurisdiction govern how directors of 
the banks are able to adjust LLP and hence, by definition, manipulate profits.  The first of the 
three main associated strands in the banking literature relates to pro-cyclical provisioning 
where, in economic booms, banks lend more and increase their profits by running down 
reserves and reducing provisions as anticipated loan defaults decrease, thereby freeing up 
cash.  Contrariwise, in economic downturns, banks cut back lending and increase provisions 
as anticipated loan defaults rise, which feed back into GDP thus in certain cases exacerbating 
the business cycle
6
. 
Secondly, under the ‘income-smoothing’ hypothesis, banks use provisioning so that, 
across the business cycle, they are able to manipulate profits and thus smooth returns.  Thus, 
while Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) find that, from a sample of 29 OECD countries, LLP 
is used as a pro-cyclical provisioning tool by US, Japanese, French and Italian banks, and 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) identify pro-cyclical provisioning used by a sample of 186 
European banks, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Agarwal et al. (2007) also find that 
Luxemburg and Japanese banks used LLP as an income-smoothing tool.  And thirdly, there is 
discussion of ‘dynamic provisioning’ (Wezel et al. (2012)), a policy pursued by Spanish 
banks since 2000, with changes being incorporated when International Financial Reporting 
Standards were introduced in 2004.  Saurina (2009), in a World Bank Report, argued 
“dynamic provisions have contributed to the stability of the Spanish financial system and 
allowed Spanish banks to deal with the crisis from a much better starting point” (page 4), 
although given the current failings in the Spanish system, one might now choose to disagree!  
While the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (2009) concluded that “the impact 
on the P&L of Spanish banks has been significant: the statistical [dynamic] provisions, on 
average, amounted to around 10% of the net operating income of the banks” (page 8).  
Hence, even within the European Union, different systems have lead to different calculations 
of profit
7
.  In relation to efficiency studies that utilise LLP as a risk control variable, these 
                                                 
6
 Proposals for counter-cyclical provisioning under Basel III are designed to address this issue (Basel 
Committee, 2010). 
7
  Some studies have used LLP in cross country estimations, including Delis and Papanikolaou (2009), whose 
sample was acceded European countries and 9 West European countries.  Hensel (2003), another to conduct a 
cross-country study, divided LLP by total assets and argued that “loan loss provisions are included as a measure 
of the cost to a bank in making loans.  When the loan is defaulted upon, the loan loss provision appears in the 
financial statements.  The loan loss provision constitutes funds which could be used elsewhere if a bank did not 
make loans, and hence represents the opportunity cost of making loans” (page 341).   
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include: as a bad input, Drake et al. (2006), Shen and Chen (2010), Paradi et al. (2011) and 
Hadad et al. (2011); and as a bad output, Park and Weber (2006)
8
 and Fukuyama and Weber 
(2009).  
With respect to equity, Berger and Mester (1997 and 2003), Fan and Shaffer (2004), 
Park and Weber (2006), Akhigbe and Stevenson (2010), Han et al. (2012) and Wheelock and 
Wilson (2012) all include this as an input to account for a bank’s solvency, which is routinely 
subject to regulatory scrutiny and control
9
.  The equity to total assets ratio has also been 
widely used in European cross country bank studies, including those by Bos and Schmiedel 
(2007) and Kosak and Zoric (2011), and, in a study concerning central and Eastern European 
banks, by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) who argue that “another issue in the 
efficiency literature is the treatment of financial capital, which accounts for different risk 
preferences.  If financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of banks that may be more risk 
averse than others and may hold a higher level of financial capital would be mismeasured, 
even though they are behaving optimally given their risk preferences” (page 561).  And, with 
respect to an analysis of 55 Gulf Cooperation Council banks, Ramanathan (2007) denotes 
equity as an input in his non-parametric specification. 
Finally, use of Non-performing Loans (NPL)
10
 as a risk control variable also creates 
difficulties as this variable does not directly affect profits and is just an accounting measure.  
As such, Berger and Mester (2003) treat it as an environmental variable calculated as the 
“market-average of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or on a non-accrual basis) 
divided by total loans” – hence being common across all banks11.  Studies that endogenise 
                                                 
8
  They subtract LLP from the good output ‘total loans’.  
9
  One of the first bank efficiency studies to include equity as a risk variable was that of Hughes and Mester 
(1993), who argued that, “recognizing that financial capital is an input but omitting it in the cost function is 
equivalent to assuming that the unit price of financial capital is perfectly correlated with one of the other input 
prices or is the same for all banks (and so its price need not be included separately in the cost function), and that 
the level of financial capital is determined endogenously as that level which minimizes cost.  If we believed that 
the bank were operating with the cost-minimizing level of financial capital but that the price of financial capital 
and price of deposits differed, we would include the unit price of financial capital in the cost function.  
However, there is good reason to suspect that the level of financial capital a bank holds may not be explained 
entirely by cost minimization.  First, regulators set a minimum capital-asset ratio for banks and this may 
constrain banks from operating at the cost-minimizing financial capital level.  Second, if the bank exhibits some 
risk aversion, then, because lower capital implies higher probability of default (capital acts as a cushion for 
losses), banks may choose a noncost-minimizing level of financial capital” (page 295-6). 
10
  One of the first bank efficiency studies to include non-performing loans was Mester (1996) who argued that 
“while the macroeconomy can affect nonperforming loans, it is felt equally across banks.  It is the differences in 
nonperforming loans across banks that capture differences in quality across banks” (page 1035).  The inclusion 
of nonperforming loans was therefore included, along with equity, in a stochastic cost frontier model to account 
for bank risk. 
11  In another study, “the bad output of non-performing loans is defined as the sum of problem loans, which are 
part of the total loans.  Problem loans are computed by adding the balance of loans to bankrupt borrowers and 
the balance of non-accrual delinquent loans” (Fukuyama and Weber (2008), page 1860). 
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NPL in the production programme include Akhigbe and Stevenson (2010), who argue that it 
is a measure of the current operating environment and “accounts for negative (and positive) 
external shocks to the Bank Holding Company’s (BHC’s) operating environment not under 
the control of the BHC’s management” (page 135).  While Fan and Shaffer (2004) note that 
NPL are “included as a measure of credit risk, which could reflect a combination of 
exogenous environmental (market) characteristics, variations in the quality of banks’ 
management and shirking, and strategic decisions to accept and price differing levels of credit 
risk” (page 6).  In contrast, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) and Delis et al. (2011) 
transformed the output variable ‘total loans’ by subtracting the value of non-performing loans 
“in order to compare banks on the same level playing field in terms of loan quality” (page 
243).  However, the latter two studies do not define what is meant by NPL.  Indeed the 
former study covers a sample of banks including Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines during one of the most turbulent periods in Asia, 1997-2001, the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC), where there were significant differences in how each country’s 
regulatory authorities allowed banks to write down bad debts so as to ensure the stability of 
the financial system.  That is, during the AFC, countries in this region adopted vastly 
different policies in respect of loan classification (e.g., in Thailand, loan classification rules 
were toughened in November 1997 and again in 1998, with a view to meeting international 
standards by 2000), the prudential regulation and supervision of NPLs and provisions (e.g. in 
Korea, new regulations were introduced towards the end of 1998 and in Indonesia in 
February 1998) and the handling of problem loans (e.g. in Indonesia, the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency was established in January 1998 to take over and restructure failed 
banks, with a new asset resolution entity being established in June of that year) - see Jao 
(2001), Chapter 2.  Finally, Delis et al’s. (2011) study covers 18 transition economies from 
eastern Europe during a period of turmoil in many financial systems.  Again, a failure to use a 
standardised definition of NPLs within the cross-country analysis risks biasing the results.  
We next present our methodology and summary data variables. 
 
3 Modelling methodology and data 
 
3.1 DEA models with undesirable inputs and outputs 
 
To facilitate our analysis of the technology of South Korean banking, let x  and y  represent 
vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, pertinent to production technology of banking 
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services in South Korea and assume that this technology can be characterised by the 
technology or Production Possibility Set (P), 
 
  ,  :  can produce  P x y x y .   (1) 
 
This set is unobserved to a researcher but can be estimated using the actual data on inputs and 
outputs via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric method to identify 
the ‘best-practice’ frontier rather than the central-tendency. The DEA can directly use 
input/output data to evaluate the relative efficiencies of decision-making units (DMUs) using 
piecewise linear approximation of the frontier of technology set (1) presumed to have 
generated the data. The DMUs that appear on the estimated DEA frontier are classified as 
efficient units.  Since its introduction by Charnes et al. (1978), the Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (CCR) model has become a popular tool of performance evaluation in many areas, 
and research on performance in banking in particular, and we follow this paradigm.   
  Recently, many researchers have proposed different types of DEA models to deal 
with undesirable inputs and/or outputs when evaluating the performance of DMUs with such 
characteristics.  The existing models can be broadly categorized into two types.  One type 
applies transformations, such as the so-called ‘ADD’ approach, proposed by (Koopmans 
(1951)), the linear transformation (adopted by Ali and Seiford (1990), Pastor (1996), Scheel 
(2001), and Seiford and Zhu (2002)), and the ‘multiplicative inverse’ (adopted by Golan and 
Roll (1989) and Lovell et al. (1995)).
12
    The other type uses a type of assumption on 
disposability, such as ‘Weak Disposability’ (see Färe and Grosskopf (2004)) and ‘Extended 
Strong Disposability’ in the case of undesirable inputs and outputs (see Liu et al. (2010)).   
  In terms of theory, loans that were made some time ago but thought to be defaulted 
on, but now are being repaid (due to positive external factors affecting the borrower, such as 
obtaining employment after a spell of unemployment), are a desirable output; whereas, for a 
borrower who is still in default, the loan is an undesirable output – leading to negative and 
positive changes in LLP respectively.  This is deemed ‘free disposability’, as reducing LLP 
frees up funds to create more outputs (loans).  In the case of Extended Strong Disposability, 
again using loans as an output, Equity can be linked to loan losses and also good risk 
management.  That is, loans can be increased if the bank holds sufficient equity to absorb the 
potential extra loan losses.  The latter situation is different to that discussed in Färe et al. 
                                                 
12
 See Liu and Sharp (1999) for further discussions. 
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(1989), where they assume that strong disposability is not possible with respect to bad 
outputs (in the general case, studies in the literature concern energy generation with the bad 
output being pollution) – implying they cannot be freely disposed of.  In our example, as the 
bank has already provisioned for the bad output (loans) in a previous period, it has no effect 
on the current balance sheet of the bank involved in the disposal of the bad loan. 
  However, it should also be noted that, even though Extended Strong Disposability is 
assumed to be bounded in non-banking industries, this might not be true in the banking 
world!  That is, if bounded, this implies that loan losses are limited to equity reserves, when 
the bank subsequently enters bankruptcy.  But, with respect to South Korean banks, the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) saw the government create the Bank Recapitalisation Fund 
with KRW20 trillion (US$13.5 billion) of funding, 4KRW trillion of which was used to buy 
subordinated and hybrid securities from 8 banks.  Given the increasing NPL from household 
loans and loans to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 2009/10, the government also 
guaranteed all SME loans made by banks through the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, meaning 
that no bank failed.  Indeed, guarantee schemes were common across many countries as they 
stabilised banking systems to ensure that that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks were still 
operational.  For example, in the US, $250 billion of the $700 billion TARP funds was used 
to recapitalise the US banking system, with Citigroup and Bank of America subsequently 
receiving additional TARP funding.  Assuming, however, ‘possible’ bounded limits on the 
undesirable inputs and outputs, the estimated technology set can be written as follows: 
 
  ˆ , , , :D U D UP x x y y  
   
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
n n n n
D D U U D D U U
j j j j j j j j
j j j j
x x x x y y y y   
   
          
       
1
1, 0, 1,...,
n
j j
j
j n 


    

  (2) 
 
 
where ( , )D Uj j jx x x , ( , )
D U
j j jy y y  are desirable and undesirable inputs and outputs of the jth 
DMU, respectively; see Liu et al. (2010). 
  By assuming Extended Strong Disposability, we can regard the undesirable inputs as 
desirable outputs, and/or the undesirable outputs as desirable inputs, and then use the 
standard Strong Disposability assumption (Liu et al. (2010)).  From this point of view, we can 
9 
 
derive DEA models of radial type for undesirable inputs and outputs, and the extra 
performance of the virtual units can be found by solving the following CCR-type input-
oriented DEA model: 
 
min   
subject to: 
0
1
n
D D
j ij i
j
x x 

  m,...,1i   0
1
n
U U
j ij i
j
x x

   m,...,1i   
   0
1
n
U U
j rj r
j
y y 

  s,...,1r   0
1
n
D D
j rj r
j
y y

   s,...,1r   (3) 
   0, 0, 1,...,j j n    . 
By adding the convexity constraint 
n
j 1
1j

 , we can obtain the BCC-type Technical 
Efficiency (TE) scores and, hence, the Overall Efficiency (OE) scores (see note 17 below). 
 
3.2 Adapted Li test for analysing the different models 
 
There are different ways of making formal comparisons or tests between results from 
different models.  The simplest, perhaps, is the comparison of the means (i.e., first moments 
of distributions) and another simple and popular approach is the comparison of variances 
(i.e., second moments).  The approach we take here as the main tool is to compare the 
distributions of efficiency scores from different models by estimating the corresponding 
densities and testing their equalities. For this purpose we use the testing ideas of Li (1996, 
1999), based on kernel-density estimators and bootstrap, and in particular, its adaptation to 
DEA context from Simar and Zelenyuk (2006).  Note that this test is often used to test the 
equality of distributions from different samples, but it is general enough to test the equality of 
distributions of a variable from the same sample that passed through different estimators.  
The idea of such an application is similar in the spirit to many statistical tests, where different 
estimators are used for estimating the same target in different ways and the question is 
whether the difference they yield for a particular sample is due to the estimation noise or is 
systematic.   
 To be precise, let    
            be a set of efficiency scores obtained using DEA for 
a model, call it model A, for a given sample of observations on banks  (     )            
10 
 
and let    
            be another set of efficiency scores obtained using DEA with the 
same sample but for a different model, call it model Z.  
  Let    and    be the two probability density functions corresponding to    
     
       and {  
          }  respectively with distribution functions    and    , 
respectively, that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We are 
interested in testing the null hypothesis   :     ( )    ( )      (i.e.,   ( )     ( ) 
almost everywhere) against the alternative      ( )    ( ) on a set of positive measure.
13
 
  In our analysis we wish to examine if any of the eight different model variations 
discussed below result in significantly differing distributions.  We will adopt Algorithm II 
from Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) where any DMU that scores one and hence is deemed to be 
on the frontier has its score ‘smoothed’ away from the frontier by the addition of small noise.  
That is, more formally, when we have desirable and undesirable inputs and outputs, 
( , )D Uj j jx x x  and ( , )
D U
j j jy y y , then the original estimates in each model permutation for 
the efficiency scores EˆO  and EˆT  are smoothed in the following ways: 
 
    
 
 
*
ˆ ,
ˆ ,
ˆ ,
j j j
j j
j j
OE x y
OE x y
OE x y
 
 

  
 ˆ  , 1j jif OE x y
otherwise

  (4) 
    
 
 
*
ˆ ,
ˆ ,
ˆ ,
j j j
j j
j j
TE x y
TE x y
TE x y
 
 

  
 ˆ  , 1j jif TE x y
otherwise

  (5) 
 
where the smoothing parameter, j  is selected as described in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006).     
  The next section presents our preferred banking model and the different risk variables 
and model permutations estimated to analyse whether the use of different risk control 
variables makes a significant difference to the results.  
 
 
3.3 Data choice and banking model motivation 
 
With the profit-based approach in mind, we specify eight different models (each using 272 
bank observations) – see Table 1 - which use a combination of traditional inputs/outputs, 
potentially including up to two ‘good inputs’ and one ‘bad output’.  Our choice of inputs 
                                                 
13
 We also assume the regularity conditions from Li (1996, 1999) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) are satisfied. 
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follows Berger and Mester (1997), Drake et al. (2006) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012), 
where Korean banks utilise ‘general admin and other expenses’ and, due to the international 
nature of their banking model, ‘fee and trading expenditure’ to produce outputs.  As Filardo 
(2011) notes when commentating on the South Korean banking system during the GFC, “one 
interesting feature of the international financial crisis was the severe disruption in 
international, especially U.S.-dollar-denominated, money and capital markets.  The 
disruptions raised financing costs faced by borrowers in Asia and the Pacific, which 
intensified the impact of the break in confidence.  Huge gross U.S.-dollar-denominated 
exposures in economies such as Korea proved very costly as Asian currencies depreciated.  
The disruptions happened in three ways: by directly reducing the availability of offshore 
credit to Asia-Pacific residents; by increasing demand from non-residents to borrow in Asia-
Pacific markets; and by leading market-makers to scale back their activities” (page. 10).  That 
is, before the GFC, the loan-to-deposit ratio was particularly high, as domestic lenders sought 
out investments that offered higher returns than the domestic banks.  The domestic banks 
therefore relied on non-deposit funding, which saw increases pre-GFC from 103% (in 
December 2005) to 127% in December 2007 but, after the implementation of new 
‘CAMEL’14 regulations on the banks, non-deposit funding dropped to 112% in December 
2009 and then to 98% in December 2010 (Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
Annual Report, 2010).  Thus, there is an obvious need to include ‘fee and trading 
expenditures’ in our model specification, especially given the South Korean banks’ need to 
engage in foreign currency hedging; see Ree et al. (2012)
15
.  The summary statistics of the 
variables utilised in the respective profit approach models are given in Table 1.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 Following Drake et al. (2009), on the output side we allow South Korean banks to 
gain profits from the ‘net interest revenue’ on intermediated funds, ‘fee and trading income’ 
and, finally, from ‘other operating revenues’, the last-mentioned relating to the increasing 
importance of off-balance-sheet trading in Korean banking.  Finally, as part of our addition to 
the literature concerning the nature of risk management in banking and how this should be 
                                                 
14
  Denotes capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management skill (M), earnings (E) and liquidity (L). 
15
 The need to include ‘fee and trading income’ was also noted by Doh (2012).  He observes that South Korean 
capital flows were the most volatile in Asian countries pre and post-GFC, equalling +US$78 billion between Jan 
1995 and Oct 1997, -US$21 billion between Nov 1997 and April 1998, -US$70 billion between Sept 2008 and 
Dec 2008 and -US$ 82 billion between Jan 2009 and Mar 2010. 
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taken into account when modelling banks, we use different permutations of good inputs – 
loan loss provisions and equity – and the bad output of non-performing loans, including the 
case where none of the risk management control variables is included.  The next section 
presents our results. 
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Analysis of the technical efficiency scores of the South Korean banking industry. 
 
The mean radial Technical Efficiency estimates for all banks and groups across the sample 
period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2 are presented in Table 2.  Given that these scores are averaged 
before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), they offer a simple, yet 
informative narrative on which banks and groups performed relatively-well compared to their 
competitors and also whether there were any dramatic changes in ranks or scores across the 
eight models.  As can be seen from Table 2, SC First Bank was consistently the most efficient 
across all models (apart from Model 7), followed by the Korea Exchange Bank, and the least 
efficient were the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative and Kwangju Bank (15
th
 or 
16
th
).  It is also apparent overall that the most efficient sector was that of the Commercial 
Banks, followed by the Specialist Banks, and then by the Regional Banks (excluding an 
outlier ‘best’ performer, Jeju Bank).  Finally, in relation to the average individual bank 
efficiency rank correlations, all are significant at the 1% level across all the models, thus 
showing ranks do not differ statistically when excluding or including the risk management 
variables when averaging over the sample period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 
 
Figures 1 to 3 present results for the different banking sectors but, instead of 
averaging over time, we average across each bank within the models.  This allows us to 
determine if there are any differences across models and also how the efficiency scores 
change before, during and after the GFC.  Firstly, there are no appreciable differences across 
the models in any bank sector, with all within at least a 5% standard deviation of the scores.  
In terms of the Commercial and Regional Banks, Models 1 and 8 give the highest and Models 
6 and 7 the lowest scores; yet, for Specialist banks, Models 3 and 6 give the highest and 
Models 7 and 8 the lowest scores.  Therefore, the mean Technical Efficiencies of different 
13 
 
bank sectors in South Korea are susceptible to which risk management variable(s) is excluded 
or included in the model, especially in respect of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), which is 
included in Models 1, 3, 4 and 8.  It also seems that the Specialist Banks do need equity to 
feature as a risk variable if efficiency scores are to be optimised.  These results, if replicated 
in other countries, pose the question of whether the inclusion of different banking sectors in a 
complete model is appropriate, given that biased efficiency scores could be produced. 
 When we consider how the different models’ scores reacted to the GFC, Figures 1 to 
3 show that each sector experienced a profound effect, as seen by the steep falls in efficiency 
in 2009.  The 2008 collapse in the money markets and the subsequent increase in problem 
loans in 2009 were compounded by increases in the ratio of banks’ loans classified as 
substandard, from 0.72% in December 2007, to 1.14% in December 2008, to 1.24% in 
December 2009 and to 1.90% in December 2010.  This subsequently led to the establishment 
of a KRW20 trillion (US$13.5 billion) government-funded bank recapitalization fund (as 
noted earlier) and the provision of a government guarantee of US$100 billion covering 
banks’ overseas debts.  This restructuring duly led to increases in efficiency from the fourth 
quarter of 2009
16
.  But the turmoil continued due to the on-going bad debt problem in 2010 
(for example, ‘substandard or below’ loans increased from 1.4% of loans in 2008, to 1.24% 
in 2009 and to 1.90% in 2010 for all banks; FSS Annual Report, 2010), leading to significant 
falls in efficiency for many banks during the latter half of 2010 before recovery ensued.   
 
4.2. Analysis of the technical efficiency scores of individual South Korean banks 
 
To provide an initial insight into our results we first consider the individual Technical 
Efficiency scores from the banks in each quarter, covering the period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2, as 
presented in Figures 4 to 20 (a full presentation of the results is available from the authors – 
they are excluded due to space limitations).  In terms of the best-performing and most 
consistent banks in our sample, the Korea Development Bank – a Specialist Bank – stands 
out as being on or near the frontier during the period 2007Q3 to 2009Q3.  However, in 
2009Q4, as shown in Figure 18, there was a quite dramatic collapse in the bank’s score, in all 
models, to between 0.11 to 0.13.  In the following year it jumped back to respectable levels, 
                                                 
16
 Indeed, those banks that sold hybrid and subordinated debt to the bank recapitalisation fund included the 
commercial banks Woori (KRW1,000 bn), Kookmin (KRW1,000 bn), Hana (KRW 400 bn) and the specialist 
National Federation of Fisheries (or Suhyup) (KRW100 bn), and the regional banks Kyoungnam (KRW116 bn) 
and Kwangju (KRW 87 bn).  As at end of March 2011, only the commercial banks Woori (KRW300 bn), 
Kookmin (KRW400 bn) and Hana (KRW100 bn) redeemed the debt from the government as their balance 
sheets improved post-GFC. 
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averaging 0.85 (models 1 to 8).  This blip is explained by its privatisation where the bank 
handed over its policy-related assets -- mainly equity stakes -- and certain liabilities to a new 
public entity, the Korea Finance Corporation, hence having a profound effect on its balance 
sheet.  The jump back to normality in 2010Q was due to this newly-formed banking entity, 
50%-owned by the Korean government through the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
operating at normal levels relative to its comparators. 
The Commercial Banks that exhibited relatively stable scores, averaging over 0.8 in 
all models and across all quarters apart from a one quarter dip below 0.80, included Citibank 
Korea (being on or close to the frontier during 2008Q3 to 2009Q1 – see Figure 4), Kookmin 
Bank (being on the frontier during 2007Q3 to 2008Q4 and in 2011Q2 – see Figure 6), Korea 
Exchange Bank (being on the frontier in 2008Q4, 2009Q2 and between 2011Q1 to 2011Q2 – 
see Figure 7), SC First Bank (on the frontier during 2008Q2 to 2009Q1 and in 2011Q1 – see 
Figure 8) and Woori Bank (on the frontier during 2008Q3 to 2009Q1 and in 2011Q2 – see 
Figure 10).  Indeed, having weathered the initial storm of the Global Financial Crisis that 
began in 2008, these commercial banks then found their scores declining due to market 
turmoil and difficult trading conditions.  For example, Kookmin Bank, having been on the 
frontier during 2007Q3 to 2008Q4, experienced a dramatic decline to 0.7340 in 2009Q2, 
hovering around an average score equal to 0.85 (across all models) until it picked up again in 
2011Q1 to over 0.9750.  In addition, Figure 8 nicely shows that the results are model 
dependent, even among these consistently-high performers.  That is, SC First Bank’s score 
declines in 2011Q1 from a previous quarterly score of over 0.90 to just under 0.80 in Models 
1,2 and 4 to 8, but falls even more dramatically, from 0.9376 to 0.5352, in Model 3 where 
NPL are excluded from consideration in the profit function.   
 
INSERT FIGURES 4 TO 20 
 
With respect to the Regional Banks, only Jeju Bank ever features on the frontier – 
from 2007Q3 to 2008Q4 and in 2009Q4 – with its scores fluctuating in the remaining periods 
between 0.80 to 0.96 depending on the estimated model used (see Figure 12).  For example, 
in the last quarter of the sample period, 2011Q2, Jeju Bank had an estimated score above 0.97 
in Models 1, 3, 4 and 8, but a score between 0.69 and 0.71 for Models 2, 5, 6 and 7 – again 
showing that model specification can have a significant effect on the results.  This model-
dependency of the scores was also exhibited by the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation – see Figure 19 - where it was on the frontier under Models 1, 3, 5 and 6 during 
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the period 2008Q4 to 2009Q1 (but Models 2, 4, 7 and 8 had estimated scores averaging 0.92) 
and during 2010Q1 to 2010Q2 (but Models 2, 4, 7 and 8 had estimated scores between 0.79 
and 0.92).  
Banks which exhibited Technical Efficiency stability around the 3
rd
 quartile (i.e., with 
average scores from 0.5 to 0.75) across all models only included the Regional Banks i.e., 
Daegu Bank, Jeonbuk Bank, Kwangju Bank and Pusan Bank.  The banks that steadily 
improved their efficiency scores over the same period comprise Hana Bank (see Figure 5), 
the Industrial Bank of Korea (see Figure 17) and the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation (or Nonghyup) (see Figure 19).  Contrariwise, the bank that stood out as facing a 
consistent reduction in its scores was the Regional Bank Kyoungnam Bank, with average 
scores falling from 0.76 to 0.52 over the sample period.  Finally, the banks that were 
consistently the poorest performers comprised the Regional Bank Jeonbuk Bank (+/- 0.15 
from 0.55 in all quarters for all models except for a one off jump to around 0.9 in 2010Q3 – 
see Figure 13) and the Specialist Bank the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, 
whose scores averaged around the 0.5 mark except for a one off jump to the frontier in 
2009Q4 (see Figure 20)
17
.   
 
4.3. Testing significance of the differences between the models 
In this section we discuss whether the estimated efficiency scores from the 8 model 
specifications have significantly different distributional equality.  The Simar and Zelenyuk 
(2006) adapted Li (1996) test results shown in Table 3 indicate that, out of the possible 
permutations, there are 12 significant differences across the models.  Beginning with the base 
specification, where all risk control variables are excluded (Model 7), we can determine that 
there is no difference in efficiency scores from models including only NPLs (Model 2) or EQ 
(Model 6) as risk control variables.  It is only when LLP (Model 8) is included as a singular 
risk management control variable that the efficiency score distributions become different.  
This gives us our first result.  In estimating South Korean bank efficiency, the researcher 
should always include LLP as the risk management control variable if only one such variable 
                                                 
17
  The results (not shown but available from the author) show that there is a close similarity between the 
Overall and Technical Radial Efficiency scores of banks across all models except for Jeju Bank and Jeonbuk 
Bank, who suffer a near 50% collapse from (i.e., TE) one program to the other.  This could of course be due to 
scale inefficiencies.  That is, in the CCR program, scale inefficiencies (SINEFF) are easily obtained through the 
calculation, SINEFF = 1 – (OE/TE).  In Model 1, Jeonbuk Bank has a SINEFF equal to 0.3270 and Jeju Bank a 
SINEFF equal to 0.4761.  In general, for all remaining banks and models the scale inefficiencies experienced are 
less than 0.10, implying near equality of OE and TE scores and demonstrating little scale efficiencies for Korean 
banks - hence the reason why the  OE results are excluded from the current discussion. 
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is to be included.  Indeed, the exclusion of LLP leads to many banks seeing a reduction in 
their efficiency scores, with one of the least efficient banks, Jeonbuk Bank, for example 
seeing reductions equalling 0.057 under Model 2, 0.057 under Model 6, and 0.074 under 
Model 7 relative to Model 8.  In comparison, those banks enjoying increased efficiency 
scores following the replacement of LLP as the risk control variable by another include the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation - from 0.8186 (Model 8) to 0.8938 (Model 6) – 
and the Kookmin Bank (from 0.9259 (Model 8) to 0.9271 (Model 2)).  This implies that 
Model 8, which includes LLP only, can differentiate itself from models including other risk 
management control variables when only one risk variable is to be included in the model 
specification. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 Going to the other extreme, involving a comparison of models with the one including 
all three risk variables – Model 1 - we also find some interesting results.  The inclusion of 
only singular risk variables in Models 2, 6, and 8 each gives different efficiency score 
distributions to the model with all 3 risk variables included so all three should be included , if 
available.  However, Models 3, 4 and 5, which only include 2 risk management control 
variables, are insignificantly different from Model 1, which includes all three.  Hence, we can 
say that including only 2 of the risk management control variables will give the same results 
as including all 3.  To recap, if 3 is better than 1 (which is better than 0), and 3 is the same as 
2, then including 2 risk variables is better than including 1.  To finalise, we propose that when 
modelling South Korean banks a combination of 2 variables from Equity, Loan Loss 
Provisions and Non-performing Loans be included; it is not necessary for the inclusion of all 
three, overcoming the problem of the ‘curse of dimensionality’.18 
At the theoretical level, a specification that includes all three risk management control 
variables could lead to a cancelling effect of one variable over another, hence giving the 
                                                 
18
  This type of model-dependency result was also found by Altunbas et al. (2000) where they note for Japanese 
banks “that financial capital has the most noticeable influence on the scale economy and scale efficiency results.  
If one excludes it from the estimation the scale economy and scale efficiency estimates are similar (across) years 
as the cost function which has no risk and quality variables.  Non-performing loans and the liquidity ratio appear 
to have little effect on the results.  The result, however, should be treated with caution given that the influence of 
the financial capital variable (E) may be overstated because this variable is fully interactive with the output and 
input price variables in the cost function but the non-performing loan ratios and the liquidity ratio are not (see 
footnote 3).  It could be the case that the inclusion of financial capital impacts the results most because Japanese 
banks experienced a decline in their capital strength over the period of study whereas changes in provisioning 
levels were more modest” (page 1617). 
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result that the inclusion of the three risk variables is no different from the inclusion of two 
risk variables.  For example, when declaring an increase in NPL, a bank increases its LLP (on 
the profit and loss account), which then feeds through to Equity capital.  This affects the 
retained earnings and profitability of the bank and hence reduces, next quarter – if, for 
example, operating under a pro-cyclical LLP strategy – the availability of funds to make 
loans.  Once this happens, the ‘net interest revenue’ (a good output) decreases.  By definition, 
efficiency also decreases, as good outputs decrease relative to the increase in good inputs 
(including LLP and Equity).   
South Korea also proved to be an interesting case as all banks in our sample had, 
based on performance evaluation under Basel II, a core equity Tier I ratio in excess of the 
required 7%, which increased from, on average, 8% in 2008 to over 11.5% in 2010 – with 
Shinhan Bank, Citibank Korea, and KDB maintaining particularly-high standards by running 
overall risk-adjusted capital ratios in excess of 16% and Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 12% 
(FSS, 2010).  Hence, with high overall and Tier I ratios, one could argue whether the use of 
equity as a risk control management variable in the case of South Korean banks is actually 
justified, as it proved not to be a powerful discriminatory variable in the determination of 
bank efficiency.  It did not offer valuable risk management information as all banks were 
highly-capitalised, even though some did sell hybrid and subordinated securities to the Bank 
Recapitalisation Fund.  However, the 6 banks that did participate only sold a total of 
KRW2,206 billion to the available fund of KRW20,000 billion (11%) and the majority only 
on a short term basis to weather the GFC storm. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Having elected for a profit-based approach to the estimation of South Korean bank efficiency, 
we then proceeded to provide a systematic study of the choice of risk management control 
variable in a non-parametric DEA analysis that allows for the inclusion of both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ inputs and outputs.  Using the model of Liu et al. (2010), we examine the dependency 
of the estimated technical efficiency scores on the chosen risk control variables, embracing 
loan loss provisions and equity as good inputs and non-performing as a bad output.  
 Averaging over the sample period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2, we first find that the most 
efficient banks were the Commercial Banks SC First Bank and the Korea Exchange Bank, 
with the least efficient being the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative (a Specialist 
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Bank) and Kwangu Bank and Jeonbuk Bank (both Regional Banks).  Although the actual 
efficiency scores were shown to be model dependent, rank correlations, however, were hardly 
affected by the choice of risk management control variable, with SC First Bank and the 
National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative ranking first and last respectively in all eight 
models, for example.  As for the banking groups, the Commercial Banks were shown to be 
the most efficient grouping, followed by the Specialist Banks and then by the Regional Banks 
(Jeju Bank proving to be an outlier), again across all models.   
 Averaging across the banks for each model, the mean technical efficiency scores were 
also shown to be dependent on the choice of risk management control variable.  As for the 
variability in scores across time, most banks experienced steep falls in efficiency in 2009, as 
expected given the severity of the Global Financial Crisis which struck in 2007/08, with 
recovery for many ensuing in the second half of 2010. 
 We then find that, using the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, if only 
one of the three risk management control variables is to be included in  such an analysis then 
it should be loan loss provisions.  We also find, however, that the inclusion of all three risk 
management control variables is to be preferred to just including one, but that the inclusion of 
two such variables did not produce statistically different results as including all three.  We 
therefore conclude that, given the ‘curse of dimensionality’, the preferred approach is to 
include (any) two of the three risk management control variables identified, whichever the 
experts find most relevant for the context at study.  The wider implication for research into 
bank efficiency is that the optimal choice of risk management control variable is likely to be 
crucial to the delivery of both un-biased estimates of bank efficiency and the specification of 
the model to be estimated. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics and model specifications (KRW millions) 
 
Input 1 Input 2 Good Input 1 Good Input 2 Bad Output 1 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
 
General 
Admin and 
Other 
Expenses 
Fee and 
Trading 
Expenditure 
Loan Loss 
Provisions Equity 
Non 
Performing 
Loans 
Net Interest 
Revenue 
Fee and 
Trading 
Income 
Other 
Operating 
Revenues 
Minimum 10,447 430 26,058 142,831 14,498 17,204 1,057 287 
Mean 1,885,352 93,546 654,655 3,573,595 912,627 311,233 1,721,623 1,508,540 
Maximum 30,370,602 6,327,362 66,188,273 20,231,684 11,807,233 1,935,890 29,707,369 29,467,597 
Std dev 3,907,277 471,881 13,088,737 5,752,583 2,123,081 451,664 3,892,166 3,851,159 
Model 1 Input 1 Input 2 Good Input 1 Good Input 2 Bad Output 1 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 2 Input 1 Input 2 
  
Bad Output 1 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 3 Input 1 Input 2 Good Input 1 Good Input 2 
 
Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 4 Input 1 Input 2 Good Input 1 
 
Bad Output 1 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 5 Input 1 Input 2 
 
Good Input 2 Bad Output 1 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 6 Input 1 Input 2 
 
Good Input 2 
 
Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 7 Input 1 Input 2 
   
Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Model 8 Input 1 Input 2 Good Input 1 
  
Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
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Table2 
South Korean banks’ mean Technical Efficiency scores and ranks over the sample period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Commercial Banks: 
        Citibank Korea 0.9389   (4) 0.9205   (6) 0.9359   (4) 0.9389   (4) 0.9209   (6) 0.9122   (7) 0.8991   (7) 0.9359   (4) 
Hana Bank 0.9109   (9) 0.8699   (9) 0.9105   (9) 0.9109   (9) 0.8758 (10) 0.8743 (11) 0.8655   (9) 0.9103   (9) 
Kookmin Bank 0.9277   (7) 0.9271   (3) 0.9263   (6) 0.9273   (7) 0.9275   (3) 0.9260   (3) 0.9254   (2) 0.9259   (6) 
Korea Exchange Bank 0.9551   (2) 0.9393   (2) 0.9530   (3) 0.9551   (2) 0.9399   (2) 0.9335   (2) 0.9315   (1) 0.9530   (2) 
SC First Bank 0.9602   (1) 0.9423   (1) 0.9602   (1) 0.9600   (1) 0.9459   (1) 0.9430   (1) 0.9194   (4) 0.9599   (1) 
Shin Han Bank 0.9327   (5) 0.9234   (4) 0.9303   (5) 0.9327   (5) 0.9235   (5) 0.9228   (4) 0.9226   (3) 0.9303   (5) 
Woori Bank 0.9323   (6) 0.9207   (5) 0.9251   (7) 0.9299   (6) 0.9247   (4) 0.9188   (5) 0.9123   (5) 0.9215   (7) 
Mean 0.9368 0.9205 0.9345 0.9364 0.9226 0.9187 0.9108 0.9338 
Regional Banks: 
        Daegu Bank 0.7644 (13) 0.7132 (13) 0.7638 (13) 0.7640 (13) 0.7310 (12) 0.7280 (13) 0.6982 (13) 0.7633 (13) 
Jeju Bank 0.9535   (3) 0.8925   (8) 0.9531   (2) 0.9421   (3) 0.9098   (8) 0.9054   (9) 0.8723   (8) 0.9409   (3) 
Jeonbuk Bank 0.6016 (15) 0.5442 (16) 0.6016 (15) 0.6012 (15) 0.5563 (16) 0.5454 (17) 0.5272 (16) 0.6012 (15) 
Kwangju Bank 0.5906 (16) 0.5606 (15) 0.5903 (16) 0.5905 (16) 0.5687 (15) 0.5658 (16) 0.5574 (15) 0.5902 (16) 
Kyoungnam Bank 0.7407 (14) 0.7007 (14) 0.7386 (14) 0.7407 (14) 0.7056 (14) 0.6998 (15) 0.6857 (14) 0.7385 (14) 
Pusan Bank 0.7741 (12) 0.7219 (12) 0.7731 (12) 0.7739 (12) 0.7305 (13) 0.7257 (14) 0.7038 (12) 0.7729 (12) 
Mean 0.7375 0.6889 0.7367 0.7354 0.7003 0.6950 0.6741 0.7345 
Specialist Banks: 
        Industrial Bank of Korea 0.8446 (11) 0.8182 (10) 0.8444 (11) 0.8429 (10) 0.8245 (11) 0.8242 (12) 0.8142 (10) 0.8413 (10) 
Korea Development Bank 0.9145   (8) 0.9122   (7) 0.9135   (8) 0.9129   (8) 0.9145   (7) 0.9121   (8) 0.9098   (6) 0.9119   (8) 
National Agricultural Coop Fed 0.8946 (10) 0.7923 (11) 0.8938 (10) 0.8196 (11) 0.8946   (9) 0.8938 (10) 0.7899 (11) 0.8186 (11) 
National Fed of Fisheries Coop 0.5434 (17) 0.5243 (17) 0.5434 (17) 0.5342 (17) 0.5359 (17) 0.5359 (17) 0.5243 (17) 0.5342 (17) 
Mean 0.7993 0.7617 0.7988 0.7774 0.7924 0.7915 0.7595 0.7765 
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Fig. 1. Commercial banks: mean technical efficiency scores 
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Fig. 2. Regional banks: mean technical efficiency scores 
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Fig 3. Specialist banks: mean technical efficiency scores 
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Fig. 4. Citibank Korea 
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Fig. 5. Hana Bank 
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Fig. 6. Kookmin Bank 
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Fig. 7. Korea Exchange Bank 
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Fig. 8. SC First Bank 
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Fig. 9. Shin Han Bank 
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Fig. 10. Woori Bank 
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Fig. 11. Daegu Bank 
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Fig. 12. Jeju Bank 
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Fig. 13. Jeonbuk Bank 
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Fig. 14. Kwangju Bank 
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Fig. 15. Kyoungnam Bank 
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Fig. 16. Pusan Bank 
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Fig. 17. Industrial Bank of Korea 
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Fig. 18. Korea Development Bank 
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Fig. 19. National Agricultural Coop Federation 
 
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
1.0000
2
0
0
7
-Q
3
2
0
0
7
-Q
4
2
0
0
8
-Q
1
2
0
0
8
-Q
2
2
0
0
8
-Q
3
2
0
0
8
-Q
4
2
0
0
9
-Q
1
2
0
0
9
-Q
2
2
0
0
9
-Q
3
2
0
0
9
-Q
4
2
0
1
0
-Q
1
2
0
1
0
-Q
2
2
0
1
0
-Q
3
2
0
1
0
-Q
4
2
0
1
1
-Q
1
2
0
1
1
-Q
2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Fig. 20 National Federation of Fisheries Coop 
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Table 3 
Simar and Zelenyuk adapted Li test results* 
Model P Value  P Value 
Model 1: LLP, EQ, NPL  Model 2: NPL  
Model 2: NPL 0.009 Model 8: LLP 0.091 
Model 1: LLP, EQ, NPL  Model 3: LLP, EQ  
Model 6: EQ 0.059 Model 6:EQ 0.089 
Model 1: LLP, EQ, NPL  Model 3: LLP, EQ  
Model 7: Nothing 0.001 Model 7: Nothing 0.003 
Model 1: LLP, EQ, NPL  Model 4: LLP, NPL  
Model 8: LLP 0.065 Model 7: Nothing 0.007 
Model 2: NPL  Model 5: EQ, NPL  
Model 3: LLP, EQ 0.014 Model 7: Nothing 0.089 
Model 2: NPL  Model 7: Nothing  
Model 4: LLP, NPL 0.063 Model 8: LLP 0.014 
*Only significantly-different results are shown. 
N.B. LLP is Loan Loss Provisions, EQ is Equity, NPL is Non-performing Loans and Nothing denotes no risk 
control variables included in the model. 
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